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Introduction 
Nearly twenty years of empirical evidence suggests that foreclosures sell at a discount (Forgey, 
Rutherford, & VanBuskirk, 1994; Crawford & Rosenblatt 1995; Hardin & Wolverton, 1996; Pennington-
Cross, 2006). That is, foreclosures are a negative neighborhood externality. The escalation of foreclosures 
in many urban areas during the past 10 years has increased scholarly attention on, and empirical evidence 
regarding, the negative external effect of nearby foreclosures on single family-residential property values 
(Immergluck &Smith, 2006; Shuetz, Been, & Ellen, 2008; Harding, Rosenblatt, & Yao, 2009; Lin, 
Ronsenblatt, & Yao, 2009; Leonard & Murdoch, 2009). Those findings suggest that local government 
revenue, which still is largely dependent upon property taxes in most states, may be expected to decline 
and/or shift tax burdens as market values (i.e., the base of the property tax) decline within neighborhoods 
of highly concentrated foreclosures. At a macro level, public finance scholars find that property tax 
revenue is the most stable broad-based tax revenue source for local governments, even during the most 
recent economic downturn(Mikesell & Mullins, 2008; Alm, Buschman, & Sjoquist, 2011; Carroll & 
Goodman, 2011). Empirical evidence suggests the stability of the tax base (i.e., aggregate assessed 
values), not increases in tax rates, is a key reason for property tax revenue stability (Lutz, 2008; Lutz, 
Molloy, & Shan, 2011; Alm et. al., 2011).  
How do property tax revenues and rates remain stable when the increased frequency of 
neighborhood foreclosures is expected to negatively affect market values (i.e., the base of the property 
tax)? Speculation for why property tax revenue stability exists in an environment of increasing 
foreclosures may partially result from the property tax valuation standards implemented and/or the 
inability of assessing professionals to accurately and equitably assess properties in distressed 
neighborhoods. A distinction between the property tax and other broad-based taxes is the calculation of its 
base. The property tax base is derived from value estimates (i.e., assessed values) rather than transactions 
because relatively few properties sell in a given year. The standards for estimating the value of properties 
for property tax purposes varies by state (Chicoine & Giertz, 1988). Current market value assessment is 
the prescribed valuation standard for fairly and equitably distributing property tax burden among property 
2 
 
owners (IAAO, 1999; Mikesell, 2004; Bowman & Mikesell, 1980). Beyond the valuation standard, 
scholars have found and practitioners have acknowledged that the ability to accurately and uniformly 
assess properties can vary by property and location characteristics (Thrall, 1979; Berry & Bednarz, 1975; 
Haurin, 1988; Goolsby, 1997; Allen & Dare, 2002; Payton, 2006; McMillen & Weber, 2008; Simpson, 
2008; Wojcik, 2008; Payton, 2012). 
  For the past decade, foreclosure sales have represented a growing portion of single-family 
residential real estate activity in many urban communities (Immergluck, 2011). If assessed values are 
adequately tied to changing market values, then neighboring foreclosure sales may be expected to 
negatively affect the stability of assessed values within jurisdictions. That is, the impact of foreclosures 
on property tax assessment stability is likely a function of whether or not the valuation standard is current 
and adequately tied to market values. Furthermore, even under a current market valuation standard, higher 
concentrations of single-family residential foreclosure sales may create complexities that affect the ability 
of assessors to adequately estimate property values, which directly jeopardizes property tax equity.  
The impact of property tax assessment standards and concentrated foreclosures on residential 
assessment equity of single-family residential properties is examined in this study. This study takes 
advantage of an urban community’s transition from a lagged assessment standard (i.e., where assessed 
values essentially remained the same for multiple years) to a current market value standard (i.e., where 
assessors attempted to adjust assessed values to reflect market trends). Specifically, the extent to which 
assessed values diverge from market values as a result of nearby foreclosures is examined while taking 
into account the effect of current versus lagged assessments. The study period selected for this analysis 
directly allows for the examination of differences in valuation standards during a time of increasing 
foreclosures. 
The findings suggest that foreclosures, at least in the urban area studied, are significantly related 
to a reduction in single-family residential assessed values as a result of transitioning to a current assessed 
value standard. The magnitude of that decrease is relatively small and may lead to an interpretation that 
recent foreclosures sales, even at higher concentrations, have a significant but minimal effect on 
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assessment instability as current, more accurate, assessments are sought. While single-family residential 
assessed values generally match the drop in the level of market values (sale price as a proxy) in areas of 
higher foreclosure sales, the lack of assessment uniformity as the number of foreclosures sales increases is 
substantively the same. That is, the adverse equity consequences of foreclosures is only partially, but not 
fully, mitigated by a valuation standard implemented for the purpose of providing greater equity. In a 
valuation system that seeks full market value, that finding suggests that disproportionate growth in 
foreclosures across neighborhoods may lead to disproportionate and inequitable property tax burdens 
within an urban area. This study indicates that inequities related to a valuation standard that neglects the 
most current market value criterion is more vulnerable to market forces, such as foreclosures.  
The next section provides a brief background on assessment standards, assessment equity, and 
neighborhood impacts of foreclosures. Then, the empirical framework, data, and results are examined. 
Finally, the article concludes with a summary and discussion of the findings.  
 
Background 
Assessment Standards 
The property tax remains the most important own-source revenue for local governments in the 
United States. Seventy-two percent of local own-source tax revenue came from property taxes in 2007.
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Public finance scholars tend to view the property tax more favorably than the general public (Mikesell, 
2004). In principle, scholars recognize that the property tax is easy to collect; relatively stable and 
transparent; and local service quality and property wealth are related (Bowman and Mikesell, 1980; 
Yinger, Bloom, Boersch-Supan, & Ladd, 1988; Fisher, 1996; Mikesell, 2010). However, it is generally 
agreed that those elements that make the property tax a “good tax” in principle are reliant upon its 
administration. 
The legal definition of “value” for property tax base purposes varies from state to state. Bowman 
and Mikesell (1980) explain that the word “value” in statutory property tax assessment requirements does 
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not necessarily indicate that a valuation standard is based on actual current market values or that the 
“current market value” standard is the same from one state to the next. For instance, current-market-
value-in-use is one form of assessment under the umbrella of the market value standard. That standard, as 
its name suggests, is based on the value of the property in its current use instead of the value of its highest 
and best use.
2
 Statutory fractional assessments, whereby the assessed value is estimated as a fraction of 
total value, and acquisition value assessments, whereby the assessed value is based on historic purchase 
price of each property, are two other examples of divergence from the full current market value 
assessment. Both fractional assessment and acquisition value assessment standards have been found to 
negatively affect jurisdictional assessment equity (Shannon, 1969; O’Sullivan, Sexton, & Sheffrin, 1994, 
1999; Sjoquist & Pandey, 2001). 
The cycle for assessing properties may also result in a divergence from actual current market 
value assessments and may have direct ramifications on assessment stability and equity, especially under 
fluctuating market conditions. There are three general types of cycles: mass assessment cycles, segmental 
assessment cycles, and annual assessment. Within a mass assessment cycle standard, existing properties 
are assessed on a specified date and assessed values do not change until the next mass assessment unless 
the use of the parcel is changed, demolished, or improvements are added. The time lag between 
assessment cycles typically ranges from two to ten years (Mikesell, 2010, p. 499). Segmental assessments 
are similar to mass assessment, except geographic segments of the jurisdiction are assessed on a cyclical 
basis.
3
 Changes in market values over longer periods between mass and segmental assessments may 
significantly affect the relationship between assessed values and actual current market values due to 
market changes between assessment periods. Ideally, a current market value property tax assessment 
system results in a tax base that accurately and transparently reflects, or equals, the market values of 
properties as those values change over time. Annual assessments, or adjustments, are one way to 
potentially achieve near-current assessed values.  
A more current market valuation standard versus extended lags in assessments has important 
implications for the stability and equity of property tax burden. Under a lagged valuation system, the 
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assessed value of existing properties remains constant over the lag period. The assessed values of 
properties remain stable at least for the years between assessments while market values may change. 
Owners of properties for which the market value has increased during that period pay less than their fair 
share of property taxes at the expense of owners whose property values declined. In short, while lagged 
assessed values of properties remain stable during that period, equity in property tax burden is threatened.  
 
 Assessment Equity and Systematic Bias 
The valuation standard and the condition of properties and neighborhoods within a jurisdiction 
may separately or together affect stability and equity of property tax burden within and among local 
governmental units. Assessment equity is reliant upon both the valuation standard and the application of 
that standard by assessors. A true ad valorem tax, whereby the tax is levied proportionally on the base 
value, requires that homes with similar market values be taxed at the same rate (i.e., proportionally). 
Uniformity of taxation between comparable properties is known as horizontal equity. Empirical analyses 
have shown that state laws and assessment standards directly affect assessment equity. Specifically, 
empirical findings suggest that property tax assessment equity may be affected by the valuation standard, 
level of government primarily responsible for assessment, whether or not the assessor is elected or 
appointed, and the time lag between assessments (Geraci, 1977; Bowman & Mikesell, 1978; Bowman & 
Mikesell, 1990; O’Sullivan et al., 1994; Giertz & Mehta, 1996; Strauss & Sullivan, 1998). Similarly, 
property and neighborhood characteristics such as size of house, age of house, neighborhood racial and 
household income composition, and frequency of sales in the surrounding neighborhood may lead to 
diverging tax burdens between two properties with similar market values (Black, 1972; Berry & Bednarz, 
1975; Schroeder & Sjoquist, 1976; Almy, 1977; Ihlandfeldt & Jackson, 1982; Haurin, 1988; Goolsby, 
1997; Allen & Dare, 2002; Strauss & Strauss, 2004; McMillen & Weber, 2008, Payton, 2012). 
Assessment standards and/or practices may lead to lack of uniformity in a systematic or 
nonsystematic way. Systematic bias may be associated with assessor tendencies to, or standards that, 
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purposefully or unintentionally lead to under- or over-assessment of properties with differing attributes. If 
certain property and neighborhood characteristics lead to greater systematic assessment bias, then owners 
of properties that differ only by a particular property or neighborhood attribute will systematically pay 
higher (lower) effective tax rates for the same local government services.  
 
Property Values and Frequency of Non-foreclosure and Foreclosure Sales 
Scholars not only have examined the discount price of foreclosed home sales, but also the 
external costs and societal impacts of concentrated home foreclosures on communities. Foreclosures have 
been found to have a negative effect on the value of surrounding properties and increase costs for local 
governments (Forgey et al., 1994; Crawford & Rosenblatt, 1995; Moreno, 1995; Hardin & Wolverton, 
1996; Apgar & Duda, 2005; Carroll, Clairetie, & Neill, 1997; Immergluck & Smith, 2006; Pennington-
Cross, 2006). Based on those findings, it is reasonable to assume that high concentrations of foreclosures 
may, or should, negatively affect assessed values.  
The introduction of market complexity that results from foreclosure sales also may have 
ramifications on assessors’ ability to equitably value properties. Particularly relevant to examining the 
effect of foreclosures sales on assessment equity, Allen and Dare (2002) and McMillen and Weber (2008) 
show that more arms-length sales in a neighborhood prior to reassessment lead to more uniform and less 
biased assessed values. McMillen and Weber (2008) reason that thicker markets (i.e., more sales) provide 
more information relevant to the market price of a property than thinner markets (i.e. fewer sales), 
presumably making it easier for assessors to accurately and uniformly estimate market values. However, 
growing concentrations of foreclosure sales, competing with non-foreclosure sales, within some of those 
markets may cause greater complexity in the assessment process (Lifflander 2008; Simpson 2008). 
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Empirical Framework 
As Berry and Bednarz (1975) explain, there are at least three features that affect property tax assessment 
equity. First, there are factors that influence assessor judgment that are not related to market value 
determination. For instance, the valuation standard under which the assessor operates may affect 
assessment equity (e.g., lagged assessments, non-market value assessments, or acquisition value 
assessments). In that case, the standard may be primarily responsible for variation in assessment equity. 
Second, there may be factors that affect market values that are not adequately considered by assessors 
(e.g., neighborhood distress associated with a concentration of foreclosures). Finally, there are property 
attributes that assessors simply value differently than the market (e.g., land value). 
In this study, the primary focus is on the extent to which the external effect of foreclosures is 
equally reflected in assessed values and market values under two valuation standards, holding all other 
determinants constant. For the purposes of this analysis, a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) models 
are used to isolate the relationship between foreclosure sales and the assessment base (a form of stability), 
systematic bias (equity measure), and dispersion (equity measure). Table 1 illustrates how each of those 
measures is defined.
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Two dependent variables measure the effect of foreclosures on assessed value stability as a result 
of current assessment adjustment. Two additional dependent variables measure the equity implications 
associated with foreclosures in terms of systematic bias and relative (i.e., horizontal) equity at the parcel 
level. To provide a baseline, the relationship between property attributes and current assessed values 
(AVi) is examined. A ratio, CurrentAVi/LaggedAVi, is used as a dependent variable to evaluate the 
differences in attribute effects on stability that is associated with adjusting lagged assessed values to 
current assessed values. The same sample of properties, varying only in assessed values, must be 
examined to account for that difference. “Lagged assessed values” reflect the assessed values of 
properties that would have been retained had the current assessment adjustment not been implemented. 
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Therefore, this analysis addresses the difference between a previous assessment that is associated with a 
lagged cycle and that which is associated with changing assessed values.  
Two models are used to examine the impact of transitioning to current market value assessments 
on potential systematic bias. One model is the assessment-sales ratio (Current AVi/MVi) based on current 
assessed values and the other is based on lagged (Lagged AVi/MVi) assessments (i.e., assessed values that 
would have been in place had the current assessed value adjustment not occurred). Those measures 
(AVi/MVi) are similar to measures of systematic bias used by Berry and Bednarz (1975) and Goolsby 
(1997). Specifically, that measure examines the extent to which properties are generally over- or under-
assessed relative to market value.  
Similar to Allen and Dare (2002), dispersion (uniformity) in assessments is measured by the 
absolute value of the difference between the assessment-sales ratio of each observation and the sample 
mean assessment-sales ratio for both current (|Current ASi - Current ASmean|)and lagged assessed values 
(|Lagged ASi - Lagged ASmean|).Those models examine horizontal equity. For instance, if a given 
determinant has a significant and positive relationship with (|Current ASi - Current ASmean|, then that 
determinant is associated with greater horizontal inequity (i.e., similar properties would be expected to be 
taxed at different effective rates). 
The variation in all dependent variables is examined as functions of property, neighborhood, and 
jurisdictional characteristics (see Equation 1). All model specifications are semi-log. The semi-log 
transformation is justified to reduce heteroskedasticity that is associated with highly skewed variables. 
The log transformation of the dependent variable also is theoretically appropriate given that the marginal 
effects of the independent variables are likely proportional to the observed levels of the dependent 
variables. All independent variables are the same across models. That is, the dependent variable is the 
only variable to change among the models. 
       
lnYi= β0 + βkSk + βlLl + βhRh+ e      (1) 
Where: 
Y = a vector of dependent values  
9 
 
Sk = vector of property characteristics 
Ll = vector of location characteristics 
Rh= vector of jurisdiction variables 
β0, βk, βl, and  βh= corresponding parameters 
e = vector of errors 
 
The focus of this paper is on the effect of foreclosure concentrations on property tax burden as 
assessors implement a current market value standard. The effect of foreclosure sales on property tax 
assessment stability, systematic bias, and dispersion (uniformity) is operationalized by adding to the 
models the frequency of foreclosed and non-foreclosed properties within multiple radii. For brevity, X is 
shorthand for all other characteristics used in the previously explained base model. 
(2) 
 
 lnY = β0 +βfj(foreclosures) fj + βnj(non-foreclosures) nj + β(X) + e 
Where: 
(foreclosures) = a vector of the number of foreclosures within radii j 
(non-foreclosures) = a vector of the number of non-foreclosures within radii j 
Βo, βfj, and βnj= corresponding parameters 
e = vector of errors 
 
Including non-foreclosure sales in each of the specifications is important for at least two reasons. 
First, other scholars have found that non-foreclosure sales (e.g., arm-length transactions) are significantly 
related to assessment performance (Allen & Dare, 2002; McMillen & Weber, 2008). Secondly, including 
both foreclosures and non-foreclosures in adapted versions of the models allows for an additional 
hypothesis to be tested—that is, the differential effect of foreclosures and non-foreclosures on each of the 
dependent variables can be tested.
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Marion County as a Case Study 
Marion County (primarily Indianapolis), Indiana, is properly suited for this analysis. Marion 
County is an urban area of a state that mandated a property tax assessment standard to current market 
value assessment and experienced relatively high levels and concentrations of single-family residential 
foreclosures during the period studied. It contains an adequate amount of social and housing stock 
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diversity. Marion County is the core county of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). In 
his national study of foreclosure rates in the 75 largest MSAs, Immergluck (2011) found the Indianapolis 
MSA to be a traditional weak-to stable-market metropolitan area with an accumulation and concentrations 
of neighborhood foreclosures consistent with Minneapolis, Atlanta, Detroit, Memphis, Cleveland, and 
Denver (2011, p. 138). These MSAs have experienced a disproportionate share of high foreclosure 
concentrations in the core city.  
Figure 1 shows the percentage of sales that were foreclosed in Marion County for a four-year 
period beginning in 2003. From 2003 through 2006, the proportion of sold properties that were real estate 
owned (REO) – synonymous with foreclosures for purposes of this study – increased from 11 percent to 
26 percent of all properties sold in 2006. REO properties represent properties that are retained by lending 
institutions after not selling at foreclosure auctions. Indiana is a “judicial foreclosure” state. Therefore, the 
time period in which it takes a foreclosed property to sell may be extended relative to a “non-judicial” 
state. Figure2 illustrates the spatial concentration of foreclosures in 2004 and 2005.  
Marion County also was part of a 2002 statewide reform to meet prescribed current market value 
assessment of properties. The 2002 reform was the result of a 1998 Indiana Supreme Court ruling that 
found Indiana’s property tax assessment system unconstitutional (State Board of Tax Commissioners v 
Town of St. John,1998). Prior to 2002, the Indiana property tax assessment standard was not based on 
market values. Assessed values (known in Indiana as true tax values) were based on reproduction costs 
and were adjusted by a formula that was controlled by a state regulatory commission. The Indiana 
Supreme Court found that Indiana’s pre-2002 non-market based administrative formula assessment 
standard violated the state constitution. Essentially, the Court’s 1998 and subsequent rulings required the 
state to change its property tax system to a market value standard. Technically, the new standard is 
current-market-value-in-use. 
An assessment trending process was established as a part of the 2002 reform. The initial 2002 
market value assessments were based on 1999 cost tables and held constant through 2005. Starting in 
2006, the assessments are trended each year between mass appraisal cycles.
6
 The Indiana Department of 
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Local Government Finance (DLGF) develops the rules for annually adjusting assessed values. Based on 
DLGF rules, local assessors are responsible for determining the market value of single-family residential 
properties by comparing local sales that have occurred during the previous two years. For instance, the 
Marion County assessors primarily used arms-length sales that occurred during 2004 and 2005 to estimate 
assessed values in 2006.
7
 The intent of trending is increased accuracy and uniformity of assessments.  
Admittedly, analysis of a single county jeopardizes some aspects of generalizability. However, 
such a focus provides a unique opportunity to directly analyze the relationship between the external effect 
of foreclosures and the property tax base in an urban environment where foreclosure sales have tended to 
accumulate and concentrate. Like similar studies analyzing property tax assessment performance in a 
single urban county (Berry & Bednarz, 1975; Ihlandfeldt & Jackson, 1982; Sjoquist & Pandy, 2001; 
Allen & Dare, 2002), this case study allows for a narrower focus on property and neighborhood attribute 
effects between a lagged assessment and current assessment without the complexity of other intervening 
factors, such as differing administrative structures and resource availability. Additionally, assessed 
valuation for property tax purposes was completed by multiple assessors at the township level. Therefore, 
consistent with many urban areas, this analysis accounts for multiple assessors valuing properties within 
urban and suburban contexts. 
 
Data 
The independent variables are the same across all of the previously explained models. The 
dependent variables for each of the models are developed for the purpose of comparing stability and 
equity between a current assessment and a lagged assessment (i.e., as if assessed values remained 
unchanged). Specifically, 2006 assessed values of single-family residential properties are used to reflect 
current market value assessments. Importantly, that was the first year Indiana established and Marion 
County implemented an annual assessment adjustment. The 2005 assessed values for the same properties 
are used to compare the relationship of the independent variables on assessment stability and equity 
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between current and lagged assessments. The 2005 assessed values were based on 2002 mass appraisals, 
which were primarily derived from 1999 cost replacement tables. The 2005 transition marks an important 
transition in the valuation process. For that reason, the transition to the 2005 assessments is an important 
factor for examining a changing assessment process. 
Table 2 provides the definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the models. The 
primary data sources for this analysis are the Marion County (Indiana) Assessor’s Office, Indiana 
Department of Local Government Finance (DLGF), and Metropolitan Indianapolis Board of Realtors 
(MIBOR). Those data are at the parcel level. Assessment-sales ratios are calculated for single-family 
residential properties by dividing the 2005 (lagged assessments) and 2006 (current assessments) gross 
assessed values by the sale price of properties that were sold between April 1, 2006 and March 31, 2007.
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The post-assessment sales data were utilized to avoid issues related to sales chasing. All unit sale prices in 
the study are necessarily independent of the sale prices utilized to determine assessed values.   
The number of foreclosure and non-foreclosure sales that occurred in 2004 and 2005 are the focus 
of the analysis.
9
 The number of foreclosure and non-foreclosure sales within the 2004 and 2005 
timeframe is chosen because that is the period within which the Marion County Assessor’s Office used 
comparable sales for trending assessments in 2006. Those data were collected from the MIBOR multiple 
listing service database. The model specifications include four variables of primary interest: number of 
foreclosed properties sold within 1/8 mile, number of foreclosed properties sold within 1/8 and ½ mile, 
number of non-foreclosed properties sold within 1/8 mile, and number of non-foreclosed properties sold 
within 1/8 and ½ mile.
10
 Various radii were chosen to capture the potential non-linear effect of sales under 
the presumption of Tobler’s first law of geography, “Everything is related to everything else, but near 
things are more related than distant things” (Tobler, 1970, p. 236). That is, the influence of each sale is 
expected to decrease the farther it occurs from a given property. Including the number of non-foreclosures 
sales controls for the differential relationship between those sales and foreclosure sales. The inclusion of 
the remaining determinants is guided by the literature. 
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Two neighborhood determinants in the model are at the block group level and were collected 
from the 2000 Decennial Census. Those variables include median household income and proportion non-
white population. Several studies have tested the effect of income and non-white population on market 
values, systematic assessment bias, and assessment uniformity (Black, 1972; Berry & Bednarz, 1975; 
Schroeder & Sjoquist, 1976; Almy, 1977; Ihlandfeldt & Jackson, 1982; Haurin, 1988; Goolsby, 1997; 
Strauss & Strauss, 2004). Generally, previous findings suggest that market values increase and 
assessments are more uniform in higher income areas and in areas with lower proportions of non-white 
populations. A presented justification for those effects is that lower-income residents and minority 
residents are likely to have less political clout, thus, assessors are more likely to provide less attention in 
those areas (Bowman & Mikesell, 1978; Bowman & Mikesell, 1990). Gilderbloom, Hanka, and 
Ambrosius (2012) find no significant relationship between assessment equity and variables measuring 
class and race at the Census tract level. In the case of the assessed values presented in this analysis, the 
direction of those neighborhood attributes on systematic bias and uniformity are difficult to know a 
priori. Previous studies have focused on mass appraisals whereby assessors may have more latitude in the 
characterization of a subject property. The 2005 assessed values are based on lagged assessments with 
unchanging assessed values since 2002 and are compared to the price of sales that occurred much later. 
The 2006 assessed values are based on a “mechanical” trending process whereby assessed values are 
adjusted by sales comparisons. The purpose of those variables is to control for other neighborhood effects 
besides foreclosures. 
Property, or market, heterogeneity also is typically included as a variable that affects assessed 
values, equity, and systematic assessment bias (Schroeder & Sjoquist, 1976; Bowman and Butcher, 1986; 
Chicoine & Giertz, 1988). Generally, it is expected that the market values of properties in more 
heterogeneous neighborhoods are more difficult to estimate and may lead to greater divergence in 
assessment equity. The measure of property heterogeneity is somewhat inconsistent across studies. 
Typically, it is defined through measures of sales price or age heterogeneity. Property heterogeneity is 
tested in this study by categorizing various properties into age cohorts: 1940; 1940 to 1969; 1970 to 1990, 
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1990 to 1999, 2000 to 2006. The data for developing the cohorts come from the assessment records of 
residential properties. All single-family parcels are assigned to one of the five cohorts. Then, the 
proportion of structures in each census block group is calculated for each age cohort. Finally, the sample 
observations are assigned to their age cohort and the proportion of properties built outside that cohort is 
calculated.  
Market heterogeneity is measured by two variables, proportion of units built before and 
proportion built after. Lower proportions of properties built in cohorts before and after indicate that a 
property is located in a more homogeneous neighborhood. Higher proportions of newer and older 
properties indicate that the neighborhood is more heterogeneous. More heterogeneous neighborhoods are 
known for being difficult to obtain accurate assessed values and result in less uniform assessments 
(IAAO, 1999)  
Property variables in the models include square feet open land
11
on property, proportion of open 
land on property, square feet living area, and the age of the structure. There is a natural potential for the 
size of the parcel or size of the parcel relative to the structure footprint to lead to assessment error when 
land and improvements (i.e., structures) are initially assessed separately – as is the case for the 2005 
assessed values of observations in this study. That is, more land may be more likely to lead to assessment 
error. Square Feet Open Land addresses the effect of the absolute size of the parcel. Proportion of Parcel 
Open Land addresses the amount of land relative to the footprint of the house. 
Total square feet of a residential house also is included in the model. Berry and Bednarz (1975) 
and Goolsby (1997) find that larger houses are over-assessed in their samples of systematic bias. 
Accordingly, Allen and Dare (2002) find that the assessment-sales ratios are less uniform for larger 
houses than for smaller houses. 
Age of structure also is commonly included in studies that examine property assessment error. A 
typical finding is that uniformity and systematic bias are inversely related to age. That is, older properties 
are harder to accurately assess and generally are under-assessed relative to newer properties (Berry & 
Bednarz, 1975). Valuation systems tend to lead to over-depreciation of properties. 
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Finally, jurisdictional variables are included in the model. Township binary variables are included 
to measure unobservable effects as a result of multiple township assessors being primarily responsible for 
the assessment process and general differences in housing stock. There are nine townships in Marion 
County. Center Township, the most central portion of the county (i.e., central city), is omitted from the 
models. Therefore, all township effects are relative to the most central township in the county. 
 
Results 
Table 3 shows the OLS results for the relationship between each of the variables and the 2006 
assessed values. It also shows the changes in relationships from the lagged assessment (2005) and the 
current assessment (2006). Approximately 81 percent of the variation in 2006 assessed values is 
explained by the independent variables in the model. Effectively, that model shows the effect property 
and neighborhood characteristics on property values as defined by the assessors. The sign of each 
characteristic is consistent with expectations. The proportion of properties in the neighborhood built in 
newer cohorts is the only variable that is not at least significant at p<0.05. As may be expected, 
neighborhood income, proportion of neighborhood units built before, square feet living area, proportion 
of parcel open land, and square footage of parcel open land are all positively related to current assessed 
values. Proportion non-white and age of the structure are negatively related to assessed values. Each 
additional surrounding foreclosure sale has a negative effect and non-foreclosure sales have a positive 
effect on assessed values at p<0.01.  
The cross-sectional model examining the relationship between each characteristic and current 
assessed value provides an indication of the implicit assessed value for each characteristic. However, the 
difference in the effect of each characteristic on lagged and current assessed values is examined by the 
ratio of assessed value in 2006 (current) and 2005 (lagged), or Current AVi./Lagged AVi. The assessed 
value ratio model provides a better indication of difference in the relationship between each independent 
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variable and current and lagged assessed values. The results indicate that foreclosure sales that occurred 
during the two years prior to the assessment adjustment lead to a decrease in assessed values. That is, 
properties located among more foreclosure sales have significantly lower assessed values after the current 
assessed value adjustment. That effect is significantly different than the positive relationship associated 
with more non-foreclosures on the change in assessed values. 
Since the model is log-level, coefficients may be multiplied by 100 and interpreted as percentage 
change in the dependent variable for each one unit change in the independent variables. For instance, the 
relationship between an additional foreclosure sale within 1/8 mile and the Current AV/Lagged AV is 
negative 0.50 percent after the assessment adjustment. An additional foreclosure after trending in this case 
results in an approximate $855 reduction in assessed value. Increasing the number of foreclosures within 
1/8 mile by one standard deviation above the mean number foreclosures sales yields an estimated 1.5 
percent, or an approximate $2,165 lower assessed value as a result of the current market value assessment 
adjustment. Each additional foreclosure previously sold between 1/8 and ½mile represents a 0.314 percent 
reduction in Current AV/Lagged AV. A one standard deviation increase in the number of foreclosed 
residential property yields an estimated 6.1 percent, or an approximate $7,873 reduction in assessed value 
change. These findings still are consistent with Tobler’s First Law of Geography. The effect of one 
additional foreclosure on assessed value is smaller as distance from a given property increases. The 
relatively larger reduction at one standard deviation is the result of greater variation in the number of 
foreclosures between 1/8 and ½ mile.  
Table 4 shows the relationship between each of the determinants and the two equity measures. 
First, the results of systematic bias are shown for lagged and current assessed values (i.e.,Lagged AVi/SPi 
and Current AVi/SPi).Those models show the extent to which foreclosures lead to under- or over-
assessment. The relationship between each determinant on the dispersion from the county mean for 
lagged and current assessments (i.e., |Lagged ASi – Lagged ASmean| and |Current ASi – Current ASmean|) 
also is shown. A positive coefficient in the dispersion models represents increased assessment error (i.e., 
greater horizontal inequity).  
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Generally, the results indicate that systematic bias associated with the base neighborhood and 
property determinants was reduced (with the exception of a few variables) after the annual adjustment. 
The amount of variation explained in the models of systematic bias (A/S) is smaller after the assessment 
adjustment. Significant dispersion reduction was not as wide spread after the annual adjustment for those 
determinants that were positively related to the dispersion measure under the lagged assessment. 
Foreclosures have a significant, positive effect on systematic bias under lagged assessments. 
Similar to most of the other determinants, the systematic bias associated with foreclosures was 
significantly reduced through current assessments. Each additional foreclosure within 1/8 mile is 
associated with a 0.5 percent increase before and not significantly different from zero after the current 
assessment adjustment. Properties are over-assessed by 0.3 percent for each additional foreclosure sale 
between 1/8 and ½ mile under the lagged assessment and do not have a significant systematic relationship 
after the current assessment adjustment. 
Increasing the number of foreclosures by one standard deviation shows the relative effect of 
larger concentrations of foreclosures holding everything else constant. One standard deviation increase in 
foreclosure sales within 1/8 mile under the lagged assessment would have resulted in a 1.50 percent 
increase in the assessment-sales ratio. A one standard deviation increase in foreclosure sales between 1/8 
and ½ mile resulted in a 6.2 percent increase under the lagged assessment-sales ratio. As one would 
expect, the lagged, non-adjusted assessed values cannot account for the discount effect on property values 
associated with recent foreclosures sales. The ramifications can be fairly substantial for some properties if 
that relationship holds fairly consistently as concentration levels of foreclosure sales increases.  
The number of foreclosures sold during the past two years is generally related to less uniformity 
(i.e., positive dispersion).The effect of non-foreclosures sold on the dispersion measure under lagged and 
current assessed values is consistent with the notion that recent, nearby arms-length, non-foreclosure 
property transactions provide more information to the assessor (McMillen and Weber, 2008). Equity 
dispersion after the current assessment adjustment, however, decreases marginally as the number of non-
foreclosure sales increases. 
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The effect of each additional property sold on dispersion depends on whether or not the 
neighboring sale is a foreclosure and whether or not the assessment has been adjusted to current market 
value. Each additional foreclosure within 1/8 mile is associated with a 1.76 percent increase in dispersion 
(less uniform) under the lagged assessment and increases by 1.33 percent after the current market value 
adjustment.
12
  If the additional sale was a non-foreclosure, dispersion is reduced by nearly two percentage 
point after the current market value assessment adjustment. The dispersion of the assessment-sales ratios 
from the county mean assessment-sales ratio is 0.23 percent for each additional foreclosure sale between 
½ and 1/8 mile under the lagged assessment and is nearly the same (0.26 percent) under current market 
value assessment. If the additional sale had been a non-foreclosures sale instead of a foreclosure sale, 
dispersion from the county mean A/S would have been expected to drop by 0.33 percentage points in 
2006. 
The magnitude of the association between recent foreclosure sales and dispersion is amplified by 
examining the coefficients at relatively higher levels of concentration and assuming the relationship holds 
across the distribution. A one standard deviation in foreclosures is associated with an eight percent 
increase in the absolute deviation of the assessment-sales ratio from the county mean ratio after the 
adjustment. The dispersion associated with increased surrounding foreclosures sale is substantively equal 
to the estimated 9.5 percent increase within the same radii and at the same concentration level (i.e., one 
standard deviation) if the current market value adjustment had not occurred. 
 
Summary and Discussion 
The empirical analyses show that higher concentrations of recent foreclosures sales may 
significantly affect the stability and equity of the property tax base within residential class properties in 
urban areas. The substantive relationship between foreclosure sales and assessment stability (i.e., 
examination of the difference in the effect between foreclosure sales under lagged and current assessed 
values) is relatively small. However, through the examination of parcel level data, this study finds that a 
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portion of that small effect may be attributed to the lack of uniformity in assessed values as the 
concentration of foreclosure sales increases and concentration of non-foreclosures decreases around 
subject properties. 
As expected, the attempt to adjust assessments to current values reduced some harmful equity 
implications of foreclosures. However, even under the more current assessed values, the magnitude of 
those harmful effects on assessment uniformity (measured by A/S dispersion from the county mean) is 
fairly substantial as concentrations reach at least one standard deviation from the mean. Generally, the 
adjusted assessed values mitigated the systematic over-assessment of properties within higher 
concentrations of foreclosures. That is, foreclosures generally affect future sale prices and assessed values 
in similar ways. However, the dispersion models indicate that similar properties may be assessed quite 
differently as the number of foreclosures increases. That is, overall systematic bias toward over-
assessment may be mitigated with current assessments, but the variation among similar properties in 
highly concentrated areas is more difficult to address.  
The implications of these findings are important for understanding the impacts of neighborhood 
externalities, like foreclosures, on property tax administration. Generally, the effects of foreclosures on 
housing prices are well documented. Most studies find that higher foreclosure concentrations serve as 
negative externalities, as higher concentrations of foreclosures reduce the price of nearby properties. 
However, local governments generally do not experience immediate revenue shortfalls that are expected 
as a result neighborhood decline, in this case with a growing concentration of foreclosures. The fairness in 
tax burden in urban areas, on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis, may be affected substantially as a 
result of higher concentrations of foreclosures (Immergluck, 2011). This paper shows that the effect on 
tax burden may be mitigated by adjusting assessments on a more rapid cycle (i.e., not allowing long lags 
between cycles where assessed values remain constant over an extended period of time). As the clustering 
of foreclosures may occur over different periods of time and varies by neighborhood, so to should 
assessments to protect property owners from inequitable tax burden. While assessors should not be 
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expected to perfectly predict future assessed values, a more current system may mitigate extreme 
circumstances of property tax inequity.  
It should not be inferred that such concentrations of foreclosures deem the property tax unworthy 
as a local government revenue sources. Instead, the findings point toward policies and standards that 
maintain a current and fair property tax burden among taxpayers. Lagged assessments, especially in areas 
that experience high concentrations of distress, may lead to inequitable tax burden shifts – some of which 
may be mitigated by current market value adjustments. Also, higher concentrations of foreclosures that 
caused complexities in the market were not developed by assessors. The fact that assessors are unable to 
accurately assess properties as the number of foreclosures increases is apparent through the findings 
comparing the relationship between assessment adjustments and dispersion. In this case, the over-
assessment associated with higher concentrations of previous foreclosures sales was mitigated after the 
current market adjustment; the findings indicate that lack of uniformity (i.e., dispersion)may be the bigger 
issue. While the shift in the point estimate for over-assessment after current assessed value adjustment 
should not be ignored, the effect of recent foreclosures on property tax equity indicates that the 
complexities in assessment are encountered as a result of increasingly distressed areas. 
Understanding the impacts foreclosures have on market values and the implementation of a 
valuation process that accurately represents market conditions, especially during time of high 
foreclosures, may be a challenge for local assessors. It is an important challenge that requires instilling 
taxpayer confidence in historically one of the least appreciated taxes. State policies that maintain 
transparent, current valuation systems may assist assessors with meeting that challenge.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Measures Used as Dependent Variables  
Stability Measures   
 Current AVi Where:  
AVi = Assessed value of each observation 
 Current AVi/Lagged AVi 
Equity Measures   
 Systematic Bias  
 Current AVi/MVi Where:  
AVi = Assessed value of each observation 
MVi= Market value of each observation 
 Lagged AVi/MVi 
 Dispersion (Uniformity)  
 |Current ASi - Current ASmean| Where:  
ASi = AVi/MVi 
ASmean= ΣASi/n 
 |Lagged ASi - Lagged ASmean| 
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Table 2: Variables and Descriptions, Marion County, Indiana (n=9,435) 
Variable Description Mean St. Dev 
Dependent Variables: Stability 
Lagged AV Gross Assessed Value 2005 110,089.10 72,671.05 
Current AV Gross Assessed Value 2006 130,107.8 95,922.11 
Current AV/Lagged AV (x100) 2006 Gross Assessed Value/2005 Gross Assessed Value 118.35 26.92 
Dependent Variables: Systematic Bias 
Lagged AV/SP (x100) 
2005 Gross Assessed Value/Sales Price [(April 1, 2006 
through March 31, 2007) 86.65 24.57 
Current AV/SP (x100) 
2006 Gross Assessed Value/Sales Price (April 1, 2006 
through March 31, 2007) 98.98 17.63 
Dependent Variables: Dispersion 
|Lagged ASi – Lagged ASmean| (x100) 
Absolute Value of the Difference between A/Si and 
County Mean A/S 2005 14.90 19.53 
|Current ASi – Current ASmean| (x100) 
Absolute Value of the Difference between A/Si and 
County Mean A/S 2006 11.79 13.11 
Independent Variables 
Number of foreclosed units <1/8 mile 
Frequency of foreclosed properties sold within 1/8 mile of 
property 2.07 2.73 
Number of foreclosed units 1/8 to ½ mile Frequency of foreclosures between 1/8 to ½ mile 19.28 20.49 
Number of non-foreclosed units < 1/8 mile 
Frequency of non-foreclosed properties within 1/8 mile of 
property 8.13 6.52 
Number of non-foreclosed units 1/8 to ½ mile 
Frequency of non-foreclosed properties between 1/8 mile 
of property  77.61 44.17 
Median block group Income ($1,000) Median income for the block group 51.23 20.03 
Proportion non-white Proportion of the population non-white 23.58 25.64 
Proportion units in block group built before 
(cohort) Proportion of properties built before the property 22.21 26.68 
Proportion units in block group built after 
(cohort) Proportion of properties built after property 19.99 24.39 
Structure age Age of structure 39.16 27.98 
Square feet living area (100) Square feet living area 15.80 6.52 
Proportion of parcel unimproved land Proportion of property unimproved land 86.40 7.50 
Square feet of parcel unimproved land (10,000) Square feet of parcel unimproved land 1.15 2.99 
Center Binary Variable; 1 if in Centerr Township, 0 else.  0.11 0.31 
Decatur Binary Variable; 1 if in Decatur Township, 0 else.  0.03 0.17 
Franklin Binary Variable; 1 if in Franklin Township, 0 else. 0.07 0.25 
Lawrence Binary Variable; 1 if in Lawrence Township, 0 else. 0.16 0.37 
Perry Binary Variable; 1 if in Perry Township, 0 else. 0.12 0.32 
Pike Binary Variable; 1 if in Pike Township, 0 else. 0.08 0.28 
Warren Binary Variable; 1 if in Warren Township, 0 else. 0.15 0.36 
Washington Binary Variable; 1 if in Washington Township, 0 else. 0.15 0.36 
Wayne Binary Variable; 1 if in Wayne Township, 0 else. 0.12 0.33 
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Table 3: OLS Results of Current Assessed Value and Difference from Lagged 
Assessed Value, Marion County, Indiana (n=9,435) 
 
 
ln (Current AV) 
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ln(Current AV/Lagged AV) 
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Foreclosed Units <1/8 mile 
-0.01846 
(0.00124) 
**† -0.00504 
(0.00087) 
**† 
Non-foreclosed units < 1/8 mile 
0.00317 
(0.00049) 
** 0.00085 
(0.00034) 
* 
Foreclosed units 1/8 to ½ mile 
-0.00632 
(0.00020) 
**† -0.00314 
(0.00014) 
**† 
Non-foreclosed units 1/8 to ½ mile 
0.00142 
(0.00007) 
** 0.00052 
(0.00004) 
** 
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Median Income ($1,000) 
0.00413 
(0.00018) 
** 0.00003 
(0.00013) 
 
Proportion non-white 
-0.00084 
(0.00014) 
** 0.00088 
(0.00010) 
** 
Proportion before (cohort) 
0.00029 
(0.00013) 
* -0.00023 
(0.00009) 
** 
Proportion after (cohort) 
0.00002 
(0.00012) 
 -0.00039 
(0.00006) 
** 
P
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Structure age 
-0.00211 
(0.00015) 
** 0.00233 
(0.00011) 
** 
Square feet living area (100) 
0.04360 
(0.00047) 
** 0.00110 
(0.00033) 
** 
Proportion parcel unimproved 
0.00080 
(0.00037) 
* -0.00046 
(0.00026) 
 
Sqft Unimproved Area (10,000) 
0.00710 
(0.00087) 
** 0.00120 
(0.00061) 
* 
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Decatur 
0.03755 
(0.01838) 
* -0.04779 
(0.01284) 
** 
Franklin 
0.03623 
(0.01501) 
* -0.05591 
(0.01048) 
** 
Lawrence 
0.12852 
(0.01265) 
** 0.00302 
(0.00884) 
 
Perry 
0.06262 
(0.01276) 
** -0.07061 
(0.008910) 
** 
Pike 
0.11267 
(0.01440) 
** -0.04927 
(0.01006) 
** 
Warren 
0.02992 
(0.01140) 
** -0.07343 
(0.00796) 
** 
Washington 
0.31770 
(0.01206) 
** -0.00177 
(0.00843) 
 
Wayne 
0.08079 
(0.01141) 
** -0.05363 
(0.00797) 
** 
 
_cons 
10.64761 
(0.03693) 
** 0.13195 
(0.02580) 
** 
 R2= 0.8133 0.2332 
**p<=0.01;*p<=0.05 
†Indicates that the difference in the coefficients for foreclosures and non-foreclosures is significant at p<0.05 
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Table 4: OLS Results of Equity - Systematic Bias and Dispersion, Marion County, 
Indiana (n=9,435) 
 
 
Systematic Bias Dispersion 
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(0.00045) 
 -0.00035 
(0.00034) 
 -0.00268 
(0.00231) 
 -0.00637 
(0.00236) 
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Foreclosed units 
1/8 to ½ mile† 
0.00299 
(0.00018) 
**† 0.00015 
(0.00014) 
 0.00231 
(0.00096) 
*† 0.00256 
(0.00095) 
**† 
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-0.00048 
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(0.00012) 
* 0.00002 
(0.00009) 
 0.00363 
(0.00060) 
** 0.00207 
(0.00062) 
** 
Proportion after 
(cohort) 
0.00042 
(0.00011) 
** 0.00003 
(0.00008) 
 -0.00015 
(0.00056) 
 0.00077 
(0.00057) 
 
P
ro
p
er
ty
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Structure age 
-0.00297 
(0.00014) 
** -0.00064 
(0.00011) 
** 0.00881 
(0.00072) 
** 0.00772 
(0.00073) 
** 
Square feet living 
area (100) 
0.00142 
(0.00043) 
** 0.00251 
(0.00033) 
** 0.01055 
(0.00222) 
** -0.00012 
(0.00226) 
 
Proportion parcel 
unimproved 
0.00109 
(0.00034) 
** 0.00063 
(0.00026) 
* 0.00022 
(0.00175) 
 -0.00056 
(0.00179) 
 
Sqft Unimproved 
Area (10,000) 
-0.00226 
(0.00080) 
** -0.00106 
(0.00061) 
 0.00240 
(0.00413) 
 0.00438 
(0.00422) 
 
Ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
o
n
al
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Decatur 
0.04500 
(0.01685) 
** -0.00279 
(0.01282) 
 -0.04704 
(0.08729) 
 -0.13092 
(0.08921) 
 
Franklin 
0.04108 
(0.01375) 
** -0.01483 
(0.01047) 
 -0.27283 
(0.07126) 
** -0.44481 
(0.07282) 
** 
Lawrence 
0.01871 
(0.01160) 
 0.02173 
(0.00883) 
* -0.23143 
(0.06009) 
** -0.12484 
(0.06104) 
* 
Perry 
0.04545 
(0.01169) 
** -0.02517 
(0.00890) 
** -0.26172 
(0.06059) 
** -0.10044 
(0.06192) 
 
Pike 
0.06223 
(0.01320) 
** 0.01296 
(0.01005) 
 -0.49761 
(0.06839) 
** -0.23199 
(0.06989) 
** 
Warren 
0.08188 
(0.01044) 
** 0.00844 
(0.00795) 
 -0.05459 
(0.05411) 
 -0.11884 
(0.05530) 
* 
Washington 
-0.02761 
(0.01106) 
* -0.02939 
(0.00842) 
** 0.05887 
(0.05729) 
 -0.69381 
(0.05855) 
*** 
Wayne 
0.05271 
(0.01046) 
** -0.00092 
(0.00796) 
 -0.28721 
(0.05420) 
** -0.14527 
(0.05538) 
** 
 
_cons 
4.42390 
(0.03385) 
** 4.55585 
(0.02576) 
** 1.52300 
(0.17537) 
** 1.86912 
(0.17921) 
** 
 R2= 0.1994 0.0359 0.1020  0.11027 
 
**p<=0.01;*p<=0.05 
†Indicates that the difference in the coefficients for foreclosures and non-foreclosures is significant at p<0.05 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Sold Properties Foreclosed in Marion County, Indiana, 2003-2006 
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Figure 2: Foreclosure Sales and Non-foreclosure Sales, Marion County, Indiana, 2004-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1
Based on data collected from the US Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments. 
2
 The distinction between current-value-in-use and highest and best use essentially is a change in property 
classification. The change in use of one parcel would not directly affect the assessed value of other properties. The 
land use change would only affect the assessed value of the subject property, the aggregate assessed value within a 
given jurisdiction, and ultimately the nominal tax rate. 
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   Non-Foreclosure Sales 
 
 
Taxing Districts 
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3
For instance, a jurisdiction may assess properties on a three-year cycle with one-third of the real property parcels 
assessed sequentially each year. 
 
4
 Dispersion is the inverse of uniformity.  The farther ASi is from ASmean, the more ASi is “dispersed” from the 
sample mean AS. 
 
5
 Formally, all models may be adapted to test the null hypothesis that the relationship between foreclosure 
sales and the dependent variables is equal to the relationship between non-foreclosures sales and the 
dependent variables within j radius - H0: βfj(foreclosure) – βnj(nonforeclosure) = 0 against H1: βfj(foreclosure) – 
βnj(nonforeclosures) ≠ 0.The significance of the differential effect of foreclosures relative to non-
foreclosures is determined by t (Wooldridge, 2003): 
   
       
           
 
 
Where:  
se (βnj – βfj) = {se(βnj)]
2+ [se(βfj)
2
-2snfj]}
1/2
 
 and 
2snfj=Cov(βnj, βfj) 
 
The standard error of the difference between foreclosures and non-foreclosures is determined by defining 
a new parameter in the models: θz = βnj - βfj. The models may be adapted by initially substituting βnj + θz 
for βfj. The formal equation for significance between foreclosures and non-foreclosures is:Y = β0 + [βnj + 
θz](foreclosure)fj + βnj(non-foreclose)nj + βkSk + βjLj + βhRh+ βgTg + e.  Since βnj becomes a parameter for 
foreclosures and non-foreclosures, the equation may be rearranged by including the sum of non-
foreclosures and foreclosures for βnj. The parameter θ becomes isolated: Y = β0 + θz(foreclosure)zj 
+βnj(foreclosure + non-foreclose)nj + βkSk + βjLj + βhRh+ βgTg + e. With the new specification, θ is the parameter 
for the foreclosure effect and serves as an estimate of the difference between an additional foreclosure 
sale and non-foreclosure sale. Considering θzjand βnj together, βnj is the estimate for the effect of non-
foreclosed sales after taking into account all other variables, including foreclosed properties. The standard 
error for H1 is directly estimated, which allows for the determination of level of significance:    
  
      
 
6
 The next mass appraisal is scheduled for 2012. 
7
 The comparable sales did not include foreclosure sales. 
 
8
 Sale price is used as a proxy for market value. 
9
 Total sales include foreclosure and non-foreclosures sales.  
 
10
Initially, ten variables were tested. The initial test included the number of foreclosures and non-foreclosures within 
1/8 mile, 1/8 to ¼ mile, ¼ mile to ½ mile, ½ mile to ¾ mile, and ¾ mile to one-mile. The variables included in the 
model were empirically determined by testing whether or not the numbers of foreclosed properties within the radii 
rings were significantly different from each other.  
 
11
 Open land refers to land on a parcel that is not covered by a home. 
12
 The difference between 0.01333 and -0.00647 is equal to 0.0197. Since the difference of the coefficients is 
significant and the model is log-level, the difference represents a 1.97 percent.  
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